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JOHN CANTALIN WAHL: Barcelona: An Economic Exception for Mega-event
Host Cities
(Under the direction of Dr. William F. Shughart)
This thesis assesses the economic impact of the 1992 Barcelona Olympic
Games by comparing its benefits and costs with those experienced by other cities
chosen as Olympic venues or as hosts of similar "mega-events”. While it is true that
the economic impacts of most such events have been found to be modest, Barcelona
seems to be an exception.
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Part I: Introduction
Mega-events, as defined by the economist Porter in 1999, are "any large-scale
organized gathering that draws large numbers of people to a limited geographic
area for relatively short period of time” (Brunet 1995, p. 3). Examples are the
Olympic Games, NFL Super Bowls, the United States' quadrennial political
conventions, and the World Cup (Leeds 2008, p.461). These events all have host
cities that seek to reap the economic benefits from the events themselves, media
attention, tourism, and even those watching at home on television. Historically,
mega-events do not generate large economic impacts on host cities for several
reasons, yet Barcelona was able to reap substantial benefits from the 1992 Summer
Olympics.
This thesis assesses the economic impact of the 1992 Barcelona Olympic
Games by comparing its benefits and costs with those experienced by other cities
chosen as Olympic venues or as hosts of similar "mega-events". While it is true that
the economic impacts of most such events have been found to be modest, Barcelona
Barcelona's gains flowed from organizationalseems to be an exception.
effectiveness, the far-reaching economic and social impacts of urban transformation.
and harnessing the momentum and legacy of the Games (Leeds 2008, p. 460; Brunet
2005, p. 5). Although the majority of studies of mega-events like the Olympic Games
find a "relatively small impact" on host cities, the 1992 Olympic Games in Barcelona
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provide perhaps the best example thus far seen of exploiting that mega-event to its
fullest economic potential (Leeds 2008, p. 460; Brunet 1995, p. 3).
Barcelona's economy was jump-started due to attracting investment.
reducing unemployment by 50%, maintaining a 2% local investment, controlling
organizational costs, and investing through regional decentralization. Sponsors and
licenses contributed a substantial amount of income and the housing market was
revived. Instead of over-investing in hotel spaces, only a reasonable amount of
visitor accommodations were built initially; only after the Games was more space
added and the expansion was kept in line with tourism growth patterns. The city
also utilized as many existing structures as it could to host the Games. Purchasing
power decreased for the citizens of Barcelona due to the high rate of inflation, but
the benefits seemed to outweigh this cost. Another negative aspect of the Games
was a decline in housing affordability. Privatization of housing was prevalent during
this time and therefore public housing decreased. Housing sale and rental prices
rose substantially. The tourists that later visited started to take over much of the
housing, also. Furthermore, 624 families were displaced and relocated due to
newly-deemed Olympic sites. The substantial rise of housing prices left lower-
income earners very vulnerable.
The Games served as a protective shield for the city while the rest of Europe
went through an economic crisis. Barcelona reinvented itself by diversifying its
neighborhoods and beautifying the city, in part by adding numerous green spaces.
The port was opened up and several beaches were developed. The city effectively
became a tourist destination and the development of the city's telecommunications
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capabilities, along with its roads and airport, allowed it to become a center of
Europe. The increase in revenue for the public sector was very high because many of
the Olympic activities were taxable. The majority of the people were energized both
by the Games and the changes and improvements they brought to the city. This
pushed them to join in on the potential benefits as well.
Another reason for the success can be traced to long-term planning before
and after the Games. The central government would provide ongoing funding. Since
the Games, the growth trend for the city has been substantially positive.
Furthermore, subsequent revisions and adjustments to the long-term plans took
advantage of globalization by making Barcelona a main connection to Europe via air
and ground. It also linked the city to Africa, America, and the Far East through
policies of education, technology, and migration.
Barcelona is the second largest city in Spain, situated on the Mediterranean
coast and has historically had many opportunities for economic success. Barcelona
has seen its economy change from fishing and shipping, to textiles and
industrialization, to now the services sector, as is typical of most other major.
modern cities. Over time, Barcelona has also expanded its geographical boundaries
and hosted events such as the Universal Expositions of 1888 and 1929 (Brunet
1995). These events added to the economy of the city in the long run and allowed
Barcelona to improve its external image and self-perception.
The economy grew once more in 1959 when trade barriers were lowered
and external investment from abroad increased dramatically. Furthermore, in 1975,
while Spain was undergoing a transition to democracy, the world was in an
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economic crisis. The economy of the city struggled with industries transferring
outside the city, rising unemployment, and decreased political activity (many
citizens began to think more individualistically; the popular belief at the time was
that one could do anything as long it did not harm anyone else even if it did harm
yourself, e.g., drug abuse). Therefore, city leaders thought the best way to jump-start
the economy was to obtain the rights to be the host city of the Games of the XXV
Olympiad in the summer of 1992. If this was attained, they believed, the city would
be able to improve dramatically through urban renovation and external projection.
Indeed, between its nomination date in 1986 and the host date of 1992, Barcelona
went from "depression to economic boom" (Brunet 1995, p. 3). Following this is a
detailed literature review of mega-events in general and their impacts on host cities
and their economies. Following the literature review, a comprehensive research on
the 1992 Barcelona Olympiad is presented from which the above conclusions can be
drawn.
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Part II: Literature Review
This section provides detailed information on previous research that explains how.
once compared to ex-post reality, ex-ante studies tend to overestimate the economic
impacts of mega-sporting events on their host cities. The review includes studies on
Super Bowls, NCAA basketball tournaments, new stadiums and professional sport
franchises, the World Cup, and the Olympic Games.
Super Bowls
Porter (1999] found that NFL Super Bowls have no statistically noticeable
impact on the economies of the host cities (Leeds 2008]. He summarized possible
reasons for inflated estimates provided by civic groups, after evaluating the
economic impacts of the Miami Super Bowl XXIII (1981], the Tampa Bay Super Bowl
XXV (1991], and the Miami Super Bowl XXIX (1995], on South Florida's economy.
Porter found that there are no measurable impacts from Super Bowl events, and
probably also from other mega-events, because the projected impact is altered
through "investigator bias, error in measurement, unanticipated leakages from the
region, substitution in consumption, diminishing returns in production, and
crowding out" (Porter 1999, p. 61]. By opportunistically raising their rates, regional
hotels and motels capture part of the Super Bowl prosperity as well.
There are several reasons why ex-ante economic impact studies are so
flawed and yet so widely accepted before the events take place. First of all,
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promoters and government sponsors pay practitioners to do the studies, thus
creating a subconscious bias in favor of sponsorship. Also, the audience of taxpaying
citizens is rationally ignorant to all of this and therefore accepts the practitioners'
estimates at face value. Impact-conscious practitioners choose geographically
compact impact areas so the economic effects will seem greater. Event promoters
consistently rely on the optimistic projections rather than the lower reality when
asking for public support for an event [Porter 1999).
Additionally, data measurement can never be exact. Although one can
measure who is in a certain area spending a certain amount of money over a specific
time [and include it in net new spending), one cannot measure who is not in that
same area at the same time spending money even though they would have been if
the mega-event were not occurring. Porter makes an analogy to foxes and hens. If a
bunch of foxes went into the henhouse, one can be sure that the hens would no
longer be there [Porter 1999). Estimated impacts for the three Super Bowls he
studied range from $117.8 million to $365.8 million over a time-span of relatively
low inflation. This illustrates the wide variation in projections.
The increased demand associated with mega-events also tends to crowd out
other activities. For instance, because of diminishing marginal returns in the short
run and decreasing returns to scale in the long run, output [e.g., overnight
accommodations, food and parking services, etc.) must be increased to meet
demand but capacity is fixed in the short run. This leads to higher costs for business
owners and higher prices for their customers. Therefore, purchases of substitutes
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increase and the impact is therefore reduced on the geographic area. If one event
completely crowds out another, the net impact is zero.
For an increase in demand to have any real effect, the sector directly
impacted must have excess capacity. At full capacity, supply is perfectly inelastic and
any increase in demand has price consequences only. Porter studied three Super
Bowls: the 1989 and 1995 Miami events and the 1991 Tampa event. In all three
cases, "ambient hotel and motel real prices rose largely while occupancy rates did
not change appreciably in the month of the event. Compared to the average for the
Januaries one year before and one year after each event, real prices rose by 11.26%,
19.83%, and 4.44% while occupancy rose only by 1.24%, 2.29%, and 4.35%
respectively (Porter 1999, p. 69). This confirms that Super Bowl demand merely
squeezed out normal demand. The additional income attributable to the mega¬
events ranges from $2.8 million to $6.7 million. This is far closer to the projections
that find little or no effect of a Super Bowl than to the findings by the practitioners of
estimated impacts of $118 million to $365 million (Porter 1999).
Also necessary to be taken into consideration is the normal hoteliers'
strategy for accommodating a Super Bowl crowd. Most Super Bowl visitors, because
they are advised by clerks and hotels to do so, reserve their rooms for an entire
week, although they may stay only three or four days. This therefore, crowds out a
typical tourist who would spend additional money on those additional days on
things such as food, entertainment and transportation. The net effect could in fact be
negative (Porter 1999).
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Economists Robert Baade and Victor Matheson [2000) questioned an NFL
claim that taxable sales in South Florida increased by more than $670 million as a
result of the 1999 Super Bowl in Miami. Their study found that the NFL exaggerated
the impact of the Miami Super Bowl by approximately a factor of 10 even when
using assumptions that favored identifying a strong economic impact [Baade and
Matheson 2004, pp. 114-115).
Coates and Depken [2006), on the other hand, found that the 2004 Super
Bowl generated $34.7 million in taxable sales for Houston. The Coates and Depken
study contradicts Coates's [2006) earlier finding that the same event did not
generate enough revenue to cover Houston's added expenses from hosting it [Leeds
2008, p. 461).
From these studies it is deduced that the economic effects of Super Bowls on
host cities generally are overestimated substantially. Because the effects are
overestimated in the first place, plans for the mega-event tend not to minimize the
possible economic inefficiencies it generates. Therefore, there is a direct correlation
between a lack of economic projections and a lack of economic planning. These
findings do not just pertain to Super Bowl mega-sporting events.
NCAA "March Madness'
The annual National Collegiate Athletics Association [NCAA) men's
basketball tournament qualifies as a sports mega-event. As with other mega-events,
host cities are interested in a possible economic windfall and therefore spend large
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amounts of money to host the tournament. The NCAA Final Four [FF) is a good
example of this.
In 1990, CBS paid $54 million for television rights. The following year, CBS
paid $143 million for the rights. In 1999, CBS Sports signed a new $6 billion, 11-year
contract to extend the rights until 2014. The previous contract, which expired in
2002, was a $1,725 billion, seven-year contract. The most recent deal represents a
220% increase annually (Baade and Matheson 2004]. These figures suggest that the
NCAA has succeeded in negotiating with networks for the rights to broadcast their
games and has learned to use its market power to extract monopoly rents.
In addition to television rights, the FBI estimates that $2.5 billion is bet
illegally on the NCAA basketball tournament each year. The NCAA basketball
tournament proves to be an event that fits the developmental strategy of cities that
try to jumpstart their weak economies by reinventing themselves as cultural or
recreational destinations. If it is assumed that cities are rational, they would not be
willing to pay more to host a FF than the benefits derived from the event [Baade and
Matheson 2004].
The estimated economic impact of the NCAA FF basketball tournament varies
greatly, as is the case with all sports mega-events. [The NBA All-Star game
produced predictions ranging from a $3 million windfall for the 1992 game in
Orlando to a $35 million bonanza for the game three years earlier in Houston.] The
Indianapolis Convention and Visitors Association [ICVA] reported that the 2000
men's Final Four, which Indianapolis hosted, generated $29.5 million in economic
impact, bringing in nearly 50,000 visitors. The original estimate of the economic
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impact was $110 million, nearly four times the amount actually calculated by the
ICVA, according to Anderson (2001). Baade and Matheson (2004) found a lower
economic impact estimate of $14 million, or just 13% of the high estimate.
Economic scholarship indicates that FF events have little economic impact on
metropolitan-area economies even though booster estimates are much more
generous. Stanford economist Roger Noll estimated  a "zero" economic impact on
San Jose's economy from the 1999 Women's Final Four. This estimate differs
drastically from the $20 to $30 million economic impact estimated by various civic
groups in San Jose (Baade and Matheson 2004, p. 114).
High-profile sporting events usually require considerable campaign
expenditures to attract the event, including state-of-the-art infrastructure and
security. The evidence suggests that FF promoters' economic impact estimates
usually exaggerate the true economic impact of the event. The main flaw in booster
estimates has to do with not fully acknowledging substantial substitution effects.
Basically, the mega-event not only stimulates spending by nonresidents, but it also
reduces spending by other nonresidents and residents alike. The evidence suggests
that the FF does not boost the local economy of the host city much at all. (See Tables
1 and 2.)
The men's Final Four has a highest probability of having a zero or negative
economic impact. There is a 5% probability that the event will boost the host city's
economy by more than $100 million. The women's FF has a 30% probability of a
zero or negative economic impact on the host city and an 80% probability that the
event will produce an economic impact of $100 million or less. Over a thirty-year
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period, there were only two occasions on which the men's and women's FF
tournaments created a statistically significant change in the host city's real income.
The economic impact of the FF thus will be more of a financial “air ball'' than an
economic "slam dunk" [Baade and Matheson 2004, p. 129).
These studies of "March Madness" host cities support the conclusion that the
economic impacts of mega-events fall short - often significantly short - of what is
projected. On the contrary, it seems that the most likely effect is zero. If planners
Table 1
Probabilities for Various Levels of Economic Impact Induced by the Men's
Final Four








Source: Baade (2004, p. 127)
Table 2














Source: Baade and N
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atheson [2004, p. 127)
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and organizers were more prudent before the fact, they would have a better chance
to reap more benefits or to find another way to generate revenue so that the mega
event could in fact be an economic boost to the host-city. Super Bowls and NCAA
basketball tournaments are indeed mega-events, but building new sports facilities
and luring professional teams can also act as mega-events and they too show the
same characteristics in terms of economic effects on host cities.
Sports Stadiums and Franchises
Economists, such as Baade and Dye (1990), have shown repeatedly that
attracting professional sports franchises and building new facilities have little
financial impact on the cities that host them (Leeds 2008). Baade (1996) found that
sports development was correlated neither with an increase in real per capita
income nor with job creation (Burbank 2001, p. 39). Coates and Humphreys (2003)
expand on this finding by showing that such facilities also have a limited geographic
impact (Leeds 2008). Bairn (1994) found that sports stadiums rarely are a profitable
endeavor for a municipality (cited Burbank, Andranovich, and Heying 2001).
Economists Rosentraub (1997) and Austrian and Rosentraub (1997) show that new
facilities often affect only a narrow segment of the local economy, such as
restaurants and sports bars. Furthermore, the boost that the franchises and facilities
provide usually is short lived (Leeds 2008).
It is therefore a weak argument to claim that a franchise or stadium
generates positive economic benefits for the host city. Instead, a stronger argument
would be based on improved traffic flows, higher quality amenities for fans (better
seats, better views, temperature control, and so on). Likely, though, these arguments
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would be insufficient to justify spending public money for such low economic
returns. Many times, stadiums and infrastructure are not built to improve the
quality of the ticket-buyer's experience. Instead, as with the World Cup, stadiums
are constructed simply to maximize seating.
The World Cup
In order to host football's [soccer's) 2002 World Cup finals, Japan spent
nearly $4.5 billion to build seven new stadiums and to refurbish three others. South
Korea spent $2 billion for ten new facilities. Most of these are “white elephants'' for
the communities that host them. For $667 million, the Japanese district of Saitama
built a 64,000-seat stadium for the preliminary rounds of the World Cup. It costs
Saitama $6 million per year to maintain the facility for a local professional team that
draws fewer than 20,000 fans [Leeds 2008).
Although Baade and Matheson [2004) found that hosting the World Cup cost
the two countries a combined total of $5.5 billion, officials in Japan and Korea
projected substantial profits before the fact. Japanese research groups projected a
$26 billion economic benefit and Korean research groups projected a $5 billion
benefit [Leeds 2008). These projections were due in part to the $960 million earned
by selling the broadcast rights [Burbank 2001, p. 33).
The difference between the two countries' projections illustrates the
fallibility of ex-ante mega-event projections in general. It is apparent that certain
variables are not included, such as long-term maintenance and other effects
previously examined in this thesis [substitution effects, crowding out, etc.).
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Although the World Cup is one of the most high-profile mega-sporting events
earth, the Olympic Games ranks number one. Just because it is the most popular,
though, does not mean that its own projections are an exception to the
on
overestimation of the economic effects on its host-cities.
Olympic Games
The Olympic Games, in the modern sense, began in 1896 in Athens, Greece.
The International Olympic Committee [IOC} was created in 1894 to bring together
amateur athletes from around the world to compete for their respective countries.
The IOC, comprised of 205 National Olympic Committees, is now the governing body
of the Olympic Games and chooses the host cities. The host countries compete
aggressively to have their bids accepted by the IOC. Only members from non
bidding nations are allowed to vote on the host city. Past corruption within the IOC
has been documented pertaining to awarding host cities through bribery in places
such as Salt Lake City and Atlanta.
In order to be selected as a host city, countries must fulfill a number of IOC
requirements. They include the following:
1. Submit their request via their National Olympic Committee
[NOC}. They then become applicant cities.
2. Complete a first IOC questionnaire for applicant cities.
3. Be selected as candidate cities based on their answers to the
questionnaire.
4. Answer a second questionnaire for candidate cities, and
submit a candidature file.
5. Host the Evaluation Commission, which makes a four-day visit
to each candidate city.
6. Present their candidature to the IOC Session, i.e., the general
assembly of IOC members, which has the power to elect the
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host cities of the Olympic Games. (International Olympic
Committee 2008)
The questionnaire includes "overall concept, finance, political support.
security, accommodation, and infrastructure" (BBC 2004). Host cities are chosen far
in advance. The 2014 Winter Ol3onpics host city, Sochi, Russia, was selected in July
2007, for instance.
Considered to be the site of the first post-modern Olympic Games, Rome
developed a modern municipal water supply system and airport facilities to host the
1960 Olympic Games. It also made numerous decorative improvements to the city's
landscape and environment. The Tokyo Olympics of 1964 relied mainly on existing
buildings for sporting venues and athletes' housing (the Ol3nnpic Village), but the
organizers and government spent $2.7 billion on a variety of urban development
projects, such as twenty-two main highways to handle the short-term and long-term
traffic, two new underground railway lines, harbor development, water supply.
sewage disposal plants, public health improvements, and tourist accommodations
(Essex 1998, p. 195).
The Mexico City Games of 1968 produced only modest levels of investment
and likewise used existing facilities to host events. Even so, the cost of the Games
were such that many ordinary Mexicans questioned whether the money might not
have been better spent on dealing with poverty and alleviating the city's severe
social problems (Essex 1998). As he put it.
In terms of social equity, the question contested is whether urban
public investment for such events represents a subsidy to the affluent
consumers and visitors at the expense of local collective consumption
for the underprivileged. Investment in new buildings and
infrastructure, whether sports stadiums, new roads, or shopping
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malls, may lead to the neglect of other community needs such as
education and training, affordable housing or the quality of social
services. (Essex 1998, p. 202}
Munich converted its Olympic Village into housing for lower income families
and single persons after it hosted the 1972 Games. Since then, the village has
become a successful self-sustaining community. Additionally, other successful long¬
term projects included a pedestrian-friendly historic quarter, the improvement of
public transport, underground car parking, the construction of three new
expressways, and the development of a new shopping center with hotels (Essex
1998, p. 195).
The IOC awarded the 1976 Games to Montreal to prove that a smaller city
could stage the event on an entirely self-financed basis. In practice, this ambition
failed very badly. The development of facilities faced many problems associated
with the international recession and global inflation. Other problems included an
unstable site for the Olympic Park and the use of new construction materials and
building techniques that resulted in major cost over-runs. Additionally, because of
labor-relation disputes that resulted in 154 lost working days, a twenty-four hour
work schedule was required to complete the facilities on time (Essex 1998, pp. 195-
197}.
Montreal spent nearly C$1.6 billion on the 1980 Games. Lacking a significant
tax base, the city ended up with a debt of nearly C$1 billion (US$750 million}. This
would be paid in part by residents who were never alive to see the Olympic torch lit
(Leeds 2008 p. 198}. The Montreal Games underlined the conclusion that staging the
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Olympics can be high-risk strategy for the host city and one that can result in long¬
term indebtedness [Essex 1998, pp. 195-197).
Baade and Matheson [2002) found that the 1984 Summer Olympics had no
lasting impacts on the Los Angeles economy, although that event had previously
been hailed as an economic success [Leeds 2008, p. 461). The LA Games of 1984
generated comparatively low investments in new facilities and relied almost
entirely on private sector funding. The organizers used existing sports facilities and
accommodations across the city, including the 1932 Olympic Stadium and student
housing at UCLA and the University of Southern California, in order to avoid large
capital expenditures. Although there was little change in the city's infrastructure,
there was significant commercial success coming from increased television income
and business sponsorship [Lenskyj 2000). The LA76 bid committee decided that the
games could be financed privately and that the host city, not the IOC, could negotiate
television rights [Burbank 2001, p. 57-58).
These Games were known as the "capitalist games" because the organizing
committee focused on raising private funding, involving as many volunteers as
possible to minimize cost, and putting sporting competition on a sound financial
footing. The LAOOC tried to maximize its revenue wherever possible, be it by selling
television rights and commemorative coins, not reimbursing the Southern California
Rapid Transit District for mass transit services, or not buying lunch for volunteers.
The LAOOC used the entrepreneurship model for staging on the Games [Burbank
2001, p. 79).
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The games produced a surplus of $222 million, an amount that was greater
than all prior Games combined [Lenskyj 2000; Essex 1998, p.l93]. As a result, many
potential host cities began to show renewed interest in bidding for the Olympics
(Essex 1998]. Forty percent of the surplus was given to programs for youth sport in
southern California. The United States Olympic Committee kept another 40% and
the remaining 20% went to national sports federations (Lenskyj 2000].
Interestingly enough, the LA Games of 1932 also generated a surplus of $1 million
during the Great Depression (Burbank 2001, p. 57].
It was estimated that the direct economic impact on the regional economy
would be more than $1 billion. In post-Ol5mipics impact analysis. Economic
Research Associates (1986] found these estimates to be fairly accurate. It actually
cost the LA Olympic Organizing Committee $420 million and another $30 million to
operate the Olympic Village. It was estimated to cost $465 million to stage the
Olympics and to build the Olympic Village. Visitors spent $420 million on lodging
and meals while it had been predicted that they would spend $330 million. Locals
spent only $26 million, although it was predicted that they would spend $30 million.
It was also estimated that another $150 million would be added by Ol3nnpic-related
spending and cultural events, along with $100 million for media and
telecommunications upgrades. In reality, sponsors and suppliers provided nearly
$44 million in goods and services and cultural activities added another $9 million.
Local governments received $47.2 million from hosting the Olympics and California
received almost $49 million from sales, income and occupancy taxes plus the City of
LA's fees (Burbank 2001, p. 75].
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It should be noted that there were two substantial lasting effects of this
Olympics. The Olympics Arts Festival added nearly $9.2 million to the economic
impact of the Games and allowed LA to be seen as an invigorating cultural location.
Also, with the creation of the Amateur Athletic Foundation of LA, a $93 million
endowment continued to support amateur athletic competition and training in
addition to public education in the region (Burbank 2001, p. 76). Because the
absence of anticipated traffic, smog, and terrorism, added to the surplus of money
afterwards, the LA Games produced great feelings for people about the city as a
place to get things done" (Burbank 2001, p. 80).
The Seoul Games of 1988 heightened the role of urban change, including
health and hygiene control, public transportation, enlarging the airport, cultural
projects, and the refurbishment of monuments, in the pre-Olympics calculus of
prospective host cities. Not all sections of the local community benefited from these
changes to the urban environment, however. Many street stalls were moved into the
back alleys out of public sight during the Games. Walls were built to hide the slums
and poor quality houses on the torch and marathon runs. Urban spectacles can
heighten tensions and disguise social problems in an effort to project a positive
global image (Essex 1998, pp. 197-198).
The Atlanta Games of 1996 were determined to be a commercial success
because public-sector involvement was very constrained, as it was in Los Angeles.
Baade and Matheson (2004) found that the 1996 Atlanta Summer Olympics did have
a positive effect on the city's economy, but that the impact was transitory and
possibly harmed job creation in later years (Essex 1994, p. 198). The effect has
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especially been limited for those Atlanta neighborhoods that expected a windfall
from redevelopment. Most of the $76 million budget was used for landscaping the
central city and the areas around Olympic venues. Less than 10% found its way to
the poorest neighborhoods. Although Atlanta was credited for being costless to the
taxpayer, the federal government gave nearly $1 billion for the event (Burbank
2001, p. 117].
The lack of greater investment in Atlanta’s infrastructure is explained by the
local organizing committee, the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games (ACOG],
being formed as a private, non-profit making organization with responsibilities for
the development of sporting facilities only. The preparations for the Atlanta Games
are cited as a failure of American public-private sector partnerships in part because
the ACOG operated as a "privatized government", completely unaccountable to the
local population. As a result of the traffic congestion, administrative problems,
security breaches and over-commercialization, Atlanta did not receive the kind of
media attention it ideally would have liked, highlighting the dangers as well as the
benefits of being under the international 0l3onpic spotlight (Essex 1998, p. 194).
Burbank, Andranovich, and Keying (2001) claim that the city's commercial zest and
homogenized venues seemed very tacky in comparison to Barcelona's cultural and
architectural heritage (Burbank 2001, p. 114). It is estimated that tourism increased
by nearly 10% after the Games over 1995, creating nearly $4.2 billion in total
economic effect (Burbank 2001, p. 45). It also was revealed later that there was
corruption between the host-city planners and the IOC, including payments of
college tuition, shopping sprees, donation of sports equipment, and excessive
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reimbursement for delegate travel, just as with the Salt Lake City Olympics
[Burbank 2001, p. 115).
Perhaps a few lasting effects are that the $244 million investment in Olympic
Stadium (now Turner Stadium) convinced the Atlanta Braves to stay in the city. The
construction of the Olympic Village was a catalyst for the state to spend another
$194 million for university dorms, after the initial $42 million investment. Atlanta
University Center campuses also now have new sporting facilities worth over $50
million. The region never did seem, though, to receive the $5 billion economic boost
that had been predicted [Burbank 2001, pp. 118-119).
A main difference between the more successful LA Games and the less
successful Atlanta Games is that LA focused on an entrepreneurial model by
separating organizational control from local politics and actively seeking corporate
sponsors. Atlanta, on the other hand, focused on extensive urban redevelopment,
thus bringing back the problems and issues over the costs and benefits to be had
from the Games. LA did not focus on redevelopment and did not build many new
structures for the games [Burbank 2001, p. 121).
Economist Leeds [2008) found that a substitution effect also exists for the
Olympic Games. He examined the 2002 Winter Olympics of Salt Lake City and found
that the Games provided a large boost to the economies of nearby Colorado
counties. Leeds is able to conclude that the 2002 Winter Olympics resulted in
significant gains for alternative destinations and therefore a substitution effect does
exist for host cities of the Olympics and most likely other mega-events [Leeds 2008).
The 2002 Games added over $160 million in real net retail sales to the economies of
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the 16 Colorado counties with ski resorts. Ten of the counties experienced an
increase in economic activity during the Olympic year. While enhancing the
economy of Colorado, which had minimum input for the Games, the 2002 Olympics
did little for the economies of Salt Lake City and Utah.
The explanation for the drop-off is found in a spillover effect in Colorado due.
in part, to publicity. Because of all the media attention surrounding the Olympics,
people would be more aware of the opportunities in the Rocky Mountains in general
and the potential hindrances of the Olympic Games to those opportunities in certain
areas of the Rockies (the State of Utah in this case). People who were deciding to
take a skiing vacation for the first time (new skiers) would decide to go to Colorado
rather than Utah in order to avoid the expected crowds. People who take Utah ski
vacations on a regular basis (regular skiers) would also decide to go to Colorado.
Regular skiers would view Colorado's ski resorts as a good substitute for the Utah
resorts (Leeds 2008, p. 461). Colorado ski resorts would have benefitted from visits
by both regular skiers and new skiers.
Therefore, the Games could have promoted two changes: both new skiers
and regular skiers travel to Colorado to ski. Regular skiers only displace revenue in
Utah because they decide not to go there as they usually do. New skiers do not
displace the revenue because they would not have gone to Utah either way. For
instance, if Utah never hosted the Olympics, the new skiers probably would not have
gone skiing there at all because the publicity would not have prompted them to do
so.
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Throughout the preparation for and staging of the Salt Lake City Winter
Games in 2002, the Utah Tourist Bureau was very concerned with possible
displaced tourists. The Bureau's survey found that "[njearly 50% of nonresident
skiers indicated that they would not consider skiing in Utah during 2002". Data from
Calgary, reporting a 30% drop-off in ski tourism during the 1988 Winter Olympics,
supported the Bureau's report (Leeds 2008, p.461).
Expenditure in a community is increased only when there are additional
tourists ("new money"). Therefore, when a mega-event is hosted during a tourist
season, the host city is likely to see its usual tourists go somewhere else that has
similar weather and geographical conditions without the obstacles and crowds
imposed by Olympic tourists. A winter super-bowl in Miami and a Winter Olympics
in Salt Lake City (during ski season) might result only in a simple "reshuffling of
business" (Leeds 2008, p.461).
It should be noted that the LA Games of 1984 did see somewhat of a
substitution effect as well. Disneyland, Universal Studios, and Six Flags Magic
Mountain reported lower than normal attendance during that summer. The extent
of the impact was related to the park's dependence on out-of-area visitors (Burbank
2001).
The Economic Inefficiency of the Olympic Games
Several host cities have been criticized for being inefficient. The 2004 Games
in Athens will be remembered for poor planning because it was way behind
schedule, way over budget, and consumed by security concerns. After the original
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$5.5 billion budget was already set, Greece's finance minister estimated that it
would cost $7 billion. Greece would now accumulate a debt that would take nearly a
decade to repay [Wolk 2004). The Melbourne Games of 1956 built the Olympic
Velodrome, which did not conform to the specified requirements and was later
demolished. The swimming stadium was the most aesthetically admired structure
but was too costly for the Victoria Swimming Association to maintain. The
Melbourne Olympics proved to be a force for urban degeneration rather than
regeneration (Essex 1998, p. 194). In late 1998, Salt Lake City was facing a severe
crisis because it was almost $400 million in debt, having underestimated the costs.
The Games ended up doing little to revive the declining business community (Leeds
2008, p. 246).
Lake Forest College economics professor Rob Baade claims that bid planners'
economic analyses tend to be error-filled or distorted. The benefits are overstated
and many costs are overlooked. Baade maintains that economic forecasts overlook
the impact of the many people who either leave town or avoid going out because
they want to avoid traffic. Several Athenian shopkeepers reported losing 90% of
their business in the years leading up to the 2004 summer games due to widespread
construction (Wolk 2004).
Nevertheless, Baade still claims, "To me there is no doubt that professional
sports and mega-events have some positive economic impact, but the economics of
it are not what people say they are". Host city supporters argue that the games bring
benefits that are hard to identify in a simple cost-benefit analysis. Perhaps these
suitors of the games are blinded to the "substantial financial risks" by the event's
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sheer size and scope”, as Baade put it Or as economist Philip Porter writes, "there
is a certain seduction of our elected officials” because many local officials are eager
to leave behind a concrete legacy of their tenure. To them, the bigger the better
(Wolk 2004).
Many critics claim that the Games "become the tail that wags the civic dog'
by rerouting public funds that could have been used for more beneficial projects.
New York anti-Olympics activist John Fisher reported that hundreds of businesses
and thousands of residents have been displaced by the games in cities such as
Atlanta, Beijing, and Seoul. Economists argue that the Games act as a unique
industry that demands specialized facilities that are rarely used afterwards and that
take up valuable real estate. There is little data suggesting lasting economic benefits
to the host city, especially benefits that were claimed during candidacy (Wolk 2004).
Different styles of economic growth are hard to come by. In the past, cities
tried to become centers of industry. Today, they are trying to become centers of
leisure, entertainment, tourism, and sports. In 1997, tourism was the third largest
private employer nationally in the USA and the third largest component of retail
spending. Between 1987 and 1997, tourism-related jobs increased 30% and
generated $71 billion in tax revenues for national, state, and local governments in
1997. International travelers spent around $73.3 billion in the USA in 1997
(Burbank 2001, p. 35).
Because of their selection as host sites for the Olympic Games, three
American cities received federal money for local projects, such as roads, parks, and
security, that other cities could not receive. The U.S. General Accounting Office
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(2000) reported that the federal government had spent nearly $2 billion to help Los
Angeles, Atlanta, and Salt Lake City host the Olympics. Salt Lake City received about
$1.3 billion in federal aid, Atlanta received about $609 million, and Los Angeles
received around $75 million (all in 1999 dollars) (Burbank 2001, p. 33). It seems
that the model of economic sustainability and independence has worsened as time
has gone on.
Following the 1984 Olympics, the IOC’s monopoly power increased because
there were many more bidders. As a result, the Games were auctioned off for higher
prices. The price of this asset therefore approaches the expected profits. The owner
(IOC), therefore, captures all of the value of the asset, just as a monopolist extracts
all consumer surplus through the all-or-nothing demand curve (Leeds, 2008 p. 199).
Leeds also found that the winning city is likely to overstate the value of the Games
and therefore ends up paying more than they are worth. Furthermore, the resources
that cities use only in an effort to win the right to have the Olympics reduce
efficiency in the overall economy (Leeds 2008 p. 200).
The new infrastructure of Athens, which possibly adds to its economy in the
long run, included a new airport, more than 100 miles of new roads and highways, a
light rail line, dozens of high-resolution security cameras, several hundred buses
and ambulances, and a partly completed tram from the city to the port. If the
number of tourists does not change permanently, then this new infrastructure may
have been unnecessary, not to mention costly. Not all of the investment was
required for the Olympics, but much of it never would have been completed without
it. The purpose of these improvements, to the supporters, was to advance Athens
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into a modern European capital and to increase tourism. Business and tourism for
the next ten years were expected to increase by $10 billion. Most likely, that will not
be the case (Wolk 2004).
The Games since 1960 have been used as a spark for variations of urban
improvements, including new road systems, public transport initiatives, air
terminals, urban renewal programs, tourist and cultural facilities, parks and
beautification projects, and sports stadiums and facilities. Two Asian host cities
reduced pollution problems and improved the quality of water, hygiene, and sewage
disposal.
More events, more competitors, and more visitors explain the growing cost
of the Games over time. Over two million people attended the Games in Atlanta in
1996. The funding to pay for the new facilities has come from the Games' increased
revenues. The Atlanta Olympics produced $2.5 billion through television coverage,
sponsorships and ticket sales in roughly equal proportions. Increased income from
television rights is very important. NBC spent $225 million for the LA Games of
1984. It spent nearly double that, $456 million, for the 1996 Atlanta Games and
nearly $705 million for the 2000 Sydney Games. In the modern global economy, in
which major world cities compete for investment, the Olympics represent a unique
publicity platform and opportunity for location marketing (Essex 1998, p. 202).
The Olympics also seems to foster an all-or-nothing effect. Los Angeles spent
nearly $1 million (nearly $26 million in 2006 USD) to build its Coliseum in an
unsuccessful attempt to attract the 1924 Games and spent nearly another $1 million
to renovate that venue as part of its successful bid for the 1932 Games. Cleveland
27
surpassed this spending by almost $3 million ($44 million in 2006 USD) to build its
Municipal Stadium (which had the largest seating capacity of any outdoor arena in
the world) in its unsuccessful bid to host the 1932 Games. The 1992 Barcelona
Games used the stadium it built in 1929 in an unsuccessful attempt to host the 1936
Games (Leeds 2008, p. 197).
Cities tend to make certain promises to their citizens. Recently, promises of
economic benefits for the private sector within the host city and region usually head
the list of promises (Lenskyj 2000). Although some of these promises may come
true, in the long run most do not. Many boosters justify their support because they
consider hosting the Olympics as a strategy to promote tourism and to establish the
city's image as a location capable of staging a world-class event. The Games are
desirable because they ensure short-term tourism revenue (regardless of whether it
displaces other revenue sources or not) and international recognition for the city in
an increasingly globally competitive environment for investment capital. Many
residents argue, though, that they are affected negatively because of heavier traffic,
loss of affordable housing and open space, or disruption of established
neighborhoods (Burbank 2001, p. 29).
Some host cities have sought Olympics solutions for local problems,
emphasizing their prospects for lowering the unemployment rate, at least
temporarily, upgrading public transit, cleansing the environment, and building
affordable housing and sports facilities. Although these potential benefits are
important, they do not negate to the fact that ex-ante projections are overly
generous. Although there is some economic benefit for host cities, it generally is not
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nearly as much as was predicted ex ante. If it was, then plans and organization could
help modify, expand, and maximize the other possible economic benefits. Less
financial input might not undermine the positive economic effects. The only
problem is that it seems that the IOC tends to award the Games to the host city that
has over-invested the most or at least has provided the best facilities for the Games.
The next section of this paper addresses the specifics of the planning, organization.
and economic benefits and costs of the 1992 Barcelona Games.
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Part III: The Economic Effects for Barcelona
One of the two main sources used in this thesis is Dr. Brunet, a professor of
economics at the Autonomous University of Barcelona (Universitat Autonoma de
Barcelona; UAB). He has colloborated with the Center of Olympic Studies and Sport
(Centre d'Estudis Olimpics i de I'Esport) for his studies. His research on the 1992
Barcelona Olympic Games is based on quantifiable data pertaining to investments,
expenditures, jobs, contracts, and tourism. His data comes from statistics from the
Barcelona City Hall (Ajuntament de Barcelona), HOLSA (The Barcelona Olympic
Holding, S.A.) as well as the International Olympic Committee. With that being said,
no specific modeling was used to calculate the effects; the deductions stemmed from
more of a calculation and theoretical analysis. Dr. Brunet is one of the chief
researchers on the economic effects of the Games on Barcelona and it must be taken
into account that some of his information may be innaccurate due to personal bias.
Although available to him, due to laws and regulations, the official data and numbers
of the city was not obtained by the author of this thesis. The numbers and
parameters used in his research, though, are official ones.
The other main source used is Jones Lang LaSalle,  a private research
company, which provides information globally on real estate and money
management services. The research arm of the company is its main component. The
research used for its report “was the result of a collobaration between... senior
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operatives across a broad mix of business lines including hotel, office, retail.
residential, research, global consulting, investment management, land services and
corporative property services” (Jones Lang LaSalle). The motives and clients for this
report were not released and therefore it must also be noted that some of its
findings may not be completely accurate. Both sources are mainly ex post studies.
although some of Dr. Brunet's studies are ex ante with later revisions, which were
used in this thesis.
The first Olympiad Barcelona seriously campaigned to host was scheduled
for 1936. An Olympic stadium was built in 1929 in order to support the city's bid,
but as it turned out, Berlin (in order to promote  a positive image for the Nazi
regime) out-spent Barcelona and won the rights to host the 1936 Games. That same
1929 stadium became a key venue for the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games (Leeds
2008, p. 197).
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Barcelona's economic base of engineering
and manufacturing had been damaged badly by the world economic recession and
the effects of global competition. Barcelona realized that it needed to re-invent itself.
The city would benefit if it defined new roles and images for a "post-Fordist^” world
(Essex 1998, p. 198). In order to highlight the city's claim for a place within the
distinguished global cities network, the city therefore undertook huge urban
improvement programs. Starting from this point, the Barcelona Games of 1992
possibly supply the best example of using the Olympics as a catalyst for urban
change, renewal and economic development (Essex 1998).
1 This term refers to the era after that which Henry Ford created with assembly lines
and the mass employment of blue-collar workers.
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After much campaigning, Barcelona was chosen to host the 1992 Summer
Games in October of 1986. Between these two dates, the city would go from a
depression to an economic boom (Brunet 1995). The explanation for the success of
the 1992 Games lay in the strength of the organizer's goals and in its manner of
execution, all brought together in the capacity of the Barcelona economy to respond
to Olympic stimuli and to attract investment. [See Table 3.)
Table 3
Overall economic indicators of Barcelona
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177,386 210,798 241,070166,905 193,867 248,055 229,393 240,736 44.2%
International 306.2%7,080 8,037 9,731 12,524 16,475 19,062 23,593 28,760
International
as % of total
4.3% 5.6% 9.3%4.1% 4.8% 6.4% 7.1% 10.7% 162.2%
Source: Brunet [1995, p. 4
The official goals of Barcelona in organizing the 1992 Games were to
become a better forum for the meeting of athletes from around the world, offer
a
excellent competitions in accord with the Olympic spirit, and promote a great urban
transformation that would improve the quality of life and attraction of the city
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decentralization allowed numerous sub-host cities to receive the rest of the
investment, which also benefitted the region and the city. The COOB’92 closed its
accounts in July 1993, spending a total of $1,638 billion and realizing a surplus of $3
million [Brunet 2005).
Table 5 shows an extremely important component of the success of the
Games. The City of Barcelona, although responsible for hosting the Games,
contributed only two percent of the total expense. The City benefitted greatly from
spending such a small percentage of the total, but receiving most of the benefits of
the Games. The sources of funding and income mainly were from domestic and
private company investments and the COOB'92. The autonomous region [province)
of Cataluna provided 12.7% of the funding, the central Spanish government
provided 10.7% of funding, and the European Union provided 0.07% of the total
funding for the Games. While the government funded 40.3% of the Games,
commercial income provided 59.7% of it. The COOB'92's original goal was to
acquire whatever resources it could and to reach  a final balance between income
and expenditure. According to the COOB'92 on July 25, 1993, the final result was a
profit of 358 million pesetas [Cuyas 1992, pp. 83-85).
34
Table 4
Construction for the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games
DistributionInvestment between 1986-1993
Road construction projects
- Internal connections in Barcelona
35.9%
17.3%









Construction at the Poble Nou Olympic Area 22.2%
- Olympic Village Private development 10.6%
- Public development in Poble Nou area
- Other projects in Poble Nou
7.8%
3.8%
Construction in other Olympic areas of Barcelona
- Montjuic Area




- Diagonal Area 3.2%
Other projects in Barcelona
- New western urban axis [Numancia-Tarragona Area)
- New eastern urban axis (North-Glories Area]







- Other facilities (cultural, sanitary, and other]
- Improvement of hotel facilties
2.2%
12.5%
Projects in Olympic sub-sites 7.3%
Other sports infrastructure projects
- Other COOB’92 infrastructures
3.1%
1.4%
- Other Barcelona sports centers
- Other sports infrastructures
0.1%
1.6%
Total [956,630,090,000 pesetas at 1995 value)
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The COOB'92 received its income from sponsorships, radio and television
rights, ticket sales, accommodation, licenses, supply of services, participation and
collections, and sales of assets (Cuyas 1992, pp. 83, 85). Seventy-five percent of all
financing of the Olympic Games organizational budget was financed by the
COOB'92's own income (sponsorships, radio and television rights, tickets,
accommodation, licenses, and supply of services). The revenue from sponsorships
provided 30% of the total consolidated income. It came from the national and
international sponsorship program and from joint partners, world sponsors, and
suppliers of official sports material. Barcelona's single largest cash
component was the income from radio and television rights, which equaled 54,164
million pesetas ($558 million in 2000; $411.6 million 2009). Income from tickets
was 9,454 million pesetas ($72 million 2009). Over 500 licenses were permitted to
use the Barcelona'92 logotype and mascot, which generated 1,543 million pesetas
($11.7 million 2009). This revenue was obtained through a two-tiered pricing
system that demanded a minimum amount of money regardless of volume plus a
percentage of each license’s sales. Income from the supply of services included
receipts from the sale of media rights, the commercialization of three promotional
undertakings (the Sponsors' Reception Center, the Olympic torch, and the Gobi
cartoon series), the revenue and the resources generated by the Paralympic Games,
the Competitions'91, and the test events, which all equaled 14,891 million pesetas
revenue
($113.2 million 2009) (Cuvas, pp. 85-87).
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For the first time in Olympic history, the Organizing Committee had to
finance the lodging of the competitors. The COOB’92 paid for the lodging for the
days athletes were in competition and three days before and after that. The National
Olympic Committee paid around 11,000 pesetas per additional day for each
competitor. Therefore, the main net source of income for the COOB'92 was from the
accommodations paid for by the people accompanying the competitors who stayed
in the Olympic Villages and the media housed in the Media Villages. That income
amounted to 8,866 million pesetas ($67 million 2009) (Cuvas 1992, p. 86).
Income from participations and collections was generated by programs set
up by the Spanish state through lotteries, pools, stamps, and coins and direct
transfers from the State. It also included worldwide sales of commemorative gold
and silver medals of the Games distributed by the national mint. It also included
subsidies from other organizations and institutions, such as the Department of
Telecommunications and the European Community. This totaled 46,349 million
pesetas ($352 million 2009). Assets sold during COOB’92's final liquidation as a
company equaled 2,094 million pesetas ($16 million 2009). Many of the assets
depreciated very little and were sold to private individuals, private companies, and
others (Cuyas 1992, pp. 87-88). A comparative analysis between the incomes of
other organizing committees can be seen in Figure 1. Perhaps the biggest difference
from all other host cities is Barcelona's revenue from sponsors and licenses, totaling
$616 million.
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Construction, housing, and employment
Almost immediately after Barcelona was chosen to host the 1992 Games, the
city's economy improved dramatically. Unemployment dropped significantly, the
housing market revived, and the construction industry obviously underwent a
significant boom [Brunet 2005}. The construction industry represents best the
economic progress in Barcelona from 1986 to 1993. The following facts show why.
The population employed by the construction industry rose 72% from
1985 to 1992.
The peak of construction employment was in 1991.
The consumption of cement increased 74% between 1985 and 1993.
The consumption of electricity due to the production of construction
materials rose 55% from 1985 to 1993.
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Other
Income
1,004 794 56992 1,124 11 82 211 2 446
Figure 1 Organizing Committees of the Olympic Games income 1964-2008:
dynamics and structure
Source: Brunet (2005, p. 20)
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The Barcelona Holding Olympic, S.A. [HOLSA) was a joint venture set up
between Barcelona's City Hall and the central Spanish government to manage
investments. HOLSA not only built the main Olympic facilities but also most of the
new roads and the Olympic Village. One of its principal goals was to create as much
construction of infrastructure and facilities as possible that could be used after the
completion of the Games. Construction costs absorbed 61.5% of the Olympic
funding. Most of the construction work was required to host the Games, but a lot of
it was not directly related to the event [Brunet 2005).
Of all the city's construction spending from 1988 to 1991, 34% was for
expanding the surface area of parking lots, 23% was for housing, 13% was for
commercial venues, 12% was for offices, and 5% was for hotels. Office space
increased 21% during this period and this greatly offset its previous unavailability
and expense. The amount of office space built was designed dynamically so that it
would surpass the construction of office space in Brussels and Madrid but not reach
the high volume of London or Paris. Consequently, the expectation of investment in
this sector remained high after the Olympics [Brunet 1995).
The growth in housing resulting from the Games was substantial because of
Barcelona's greater attractiveness, the lack of buildable land, higher construction
costs, the rise in net family income, and the differences between the Spanish market
and rest of Europe. From 1986 to the middle of 1990, the real estate market revived
dramatically. The market declined from then on perhaps because of the global
economic crisis and the availability of housing in the newly vacated Olympic Village.
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The market price of new housing rose 240% from 1986 to 1992; it increased by
287% for existing housing over the same period (Brunet 1995].
Unemployment was on the rise until December 1986, following the city's
nomination. The curve dropped significantly until August of 1992. The period of
preparation for the Olympic Games enabled the labor market in Barcelona, its
metropolitan area, and all of Catalonia to improve drastically. The number of
registered unemployed fell from a historical high of 127,774 in November of 1986
(the month following the Olympic nomination] to a low of 60,885 in July 1992, in the
midst of the Olympic Games (Brunet 1995, p. 18]. (See Table 6].
Table 6
Active labor force and employment in Barcelona














582,078 624,946 631,697 664,104 675,424 656,575 645,833 11.0% -1.6%
125,694 118,402 97,007 70,642' 66,238i 66,295 69,941 -44.4% 5.5%
17.76% 15.93% 13.31% 9.61% 8.93% 9.17% 9.77% -7.99% 0.6%
Source: Author and Brunet(1995, p. 18]
The unemployment rate in Barcelona fell from 18.4% to 9.6% from October
1986 to July 1992. Unemployment rates ranged from 18.4% in Barcelona to 23.7%
in the rest of Spain in 1986. In 1992, the rates varied from 9.6% in Barcelona to
15.5% in Spain as a whole. Work contracts rose 2.5 times while unemployment was
reduced by half between 1986 and 1992. One year after the Games, in July 1993,
there were 49,523 fewer unemployed people than in November of 1986 (127,774].
Barcelona’s economy was more resilient in resisting the national, global, and
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European economic crisis that had begun in 1990 and continued through 1993
(Brunet 1995).
There were 17,366 fewer jobs in July 1993 than in July 1992. This figure is
strikingly similar to the annual employment gains reported by the COOB '92.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the jobs lost correspond directly to the closing of
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Figure 2
Total Employment Generated by the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games
Source: Brunet (1994, p. 19)
Three important factors about unemployment between 1987 and 1992 can
be deduced from an analysis of employment, production, investment and income:
[1] an annual average employment increase of 35,309 people was related directly to
Games-related expenditures ("organization by the COOB '92 plus direct public and
private Olympic investments"), [2] an annual average employment gain of 24,019
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people can be traced to the induced impact (“generation of the induced demand")^
and [3] the employment of an additional 20,000 people was a permanent effect
(“additional employment arising from capitalization and changes in economic
structures”) (Brunet 1995, p. 19).
Comparing Barcelona with Marseille can help to put the effects in
perspective. Marseille is a smaller city than Barcelona, although its location and
economy and even its relative size allow it to be  a good reference of comparison for
Barcelona. In 1990, Barcelona's unemployment rate was 8.93% and Marseille's was
19.75%. Barcelona's unemployment rate was 17.76% in 1986 - still less than
Marseille's rate, but close to it. It is apparent that Barcelona had an advantage over
Marseille and the main contributing factor to that advantage was its hosting of the
Olympics. Furthermore, in 1985, the population of Marseille and its surrounding
areas was 1.307 million people and Barcelona's was 3.969 million. Although
Barcelona's population was just about three times that of Marseille, the growth
pattern was quite different between the two cities. In 1990, the population of
Marseille decreased to 1.305 million people, while it increased in Barcelona to 4.101
2 The induced impact/demand refers to the change in demand triggered indirectly
by the Olympics. Direct impacts plus indirect impacts plus induced impacts equals
total economic impact. Direct impacts are the initial, immediate economic activities,
such as income and jobs, which are generated by the event (Olympics in this case).
Indirect impacts are the income, employment, and production changes within the
community, city, or region (Barcelona in this case) that are a response to the event,
e.g., from supplying inputs to it. The induced impacts and demand are households'
spending changes within the local economy in response to the direct and indirect
effects of the event, i.e., when employees of the event spend their higher incomes
within the local economy.
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million people. In 1995, the population of Marseille increased to 1.331 million
people and the population of Barcelona increased to 4.318 million people. Once
again, the advantage of Barcelona is observed in its larger population growth.
Although not situated on the Mediterranean Sea, another European city of similar
size to Barcelona in 1985 is Milan. Its population declined from 3.128 million in
1985 to 3.063 in 1990. Furthermore, the population decreased to 3.020 million and
2.985 million in 1995 and 2000 respectively. Barcelona's population increased to
4.318 million and 4.560 million in the same two years (Population division; Brunet
1995). See Figure 3 for the comparison.
In summary, between 1986 and 1992, Barcelona's economy improved
substantially. The economic crisis affected Barcelona much later than it did in other
places, but still its local economy fared better in general. The Games proved to be a
kind of “protective buffer" against the economic crisis that affected all of Europe.
From 1987 to 1992, the annual average employment effect of the Games was 59,328
people. "The result was that the drop in unemployment in Barcelona between
November 1986 and July 1992 in 66,889 people was due (at least 88.7% of it) to the


















Comparative Populations of Barcelona, Marseille, and Milan
Overall economic impact
Barcelona's direct and indirect Olympic investments were much larger than
other Olympic Games, except for the direct investment associated with the Tokyo
Games. [See Table 7.) From 1987 to 1992, the induced impact was calculated to be
$16.6 billion, the largest economic benefit generated by the Olympics prior to 2002
(Brunet 1995; Jones Lang LaSalle IP Inc. 2002J. (See Table 8.) Combined with the
direct impact, the total impact of the 1992 Games has been calculated to be $26,048
billion (Brunet 1995].
Most spectators of the Olympics watch from a television. Economic success
depends therefore largely on the income from this sector. Furthermore, the success
of the projected image and the overall international impact depends upon the
location of the television audience and the message that is sent out to them.
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Therefore, the principal effect of the Games was not the number of visitors to
Barcelona, which, let it be noted, was at shocking low levels. The main obstacle for
potential visitors was the lack of hotel space. Private investment did increase hotel
space by 38% from 1990 to 1992. In the city, on July 25,1992, there were 25,641
hotel rooms and another 15,000 in the area of Olympic influence (the region and
nearby towns) so that the total amount of space supplied was 40,641 hotel rooms.
This could accommodate a maximum of 422,666 Olympic-visiting tourists. Local
consumption by non-resident visitors (including the Ol3anpic family) is estimated at
46,090 million pesetas (Brunet 1995). Visitors were not the only factor contributing
to Barcelona's economic boost from hosting the Olympics. Lastly, recall that the
broadcast rights contributed 54,165 million pesetas $558 million (Cuvas, pp. 85-87).
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Table 7
Investment related to the Olympic Games
In millions of
SUS
Tokyo‘64 Montreal 76 Los Angeles '84 Seoul ‘88 Barcelona ‘92
M of$ Mof$ Mof$ Mof$ Mof$% % % %
26.2%A. Direct
expenditures
452,116 2.7% 2,824,863 89.0% 522,436 100.0% 1,467,853 46.5% 2,460,855
169,510 450,394 478,204 15.2% 1,361,156 14.5%l.Operational
expenditures
1.0% 411,857 13.0% 86.2%
2. Direct
investments









6,825,488 100.0% 3,174,875 100.0% 522,486 100.0% 3,155,276 100.0% 9,376,129
Source: Brunet (1995, p. 13)
Table 8
Summary of Economic Impact
Size of economy (GDP US$
bn)'’
$182.0






a: All figures in US$, based on average exchange rates during Olympic Year
b; GDP in Olympic Year
1.0%
Source: Jones Lang LaSalle IP Inc. (2002, p. 5)
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Two conclusions can be drawn from Table 9. The tax balance of the Olympic
Games up to 1992 of Spain is very positive and the tax balance of the Olympic Games
after 1992 is slightly negative. There was an accumulated total before and after the
Games of 889,848 million pesetas and an annual flow after the Games of 27,500
million pesetas. The accumulated total for the expenditures for the public treasuiy
was 522,569 million pesetas and the annual flow after the Games was close to
51,000 million pesetas. From 1986 to 1993, the "Olympic" tax balance for the public
administration was a surplus of 371,279 million pesetas and an annual deficit of
23,500 million pesetas after 1993 (Brunet 1995, p. 14).
GDP per capita for Barcelona increased by 24% from 1987 to 1991 and was
significantly higher than that of Spain as a whole and of Catalonia, which both
increased by 17%. Also, unemployment dropped by 50% in Barcelona compared
with 24% for the rest of Spain. Also noteworthy is the fact that in December 1993,
Barcelona's unemployment rate of 11.9% was lower than that of Catalonia (12%)
and Spain as a whole (16.6%). One of the negative effects was that inflation
increased rapidly in the city, especially in the housing sector (a 235% increase in
prices from 1985 to 1990) thereby reducing the citizens' purchasing power
(Marshall 1995, pp. 151-152).
Another negative aspect of the Games was a decline in housing affordability.
From 1986 to 1993, there was a 75.92% decrease in the availability of public
housing. Privatization of housing was prevalent during this time. From 1986 to
1993, there was a cumulative increase of 139% for housing sale prices and 145% for
housing rental prices. Furthermore, 624 families were displaced and relocated due
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to newly-deemed Olympic sites. The substantial rise of housing prices left the lower-
income earners very vulnerable. The tourists that later visited started to take to
over much of the housing, also (COHRE 2007).
Table 9
Tax balance of the 1992 Olympic Games of Spain
A. Revenue from the public administrations [in millions of pesetas)
Synthesis
Accumulated total before and during the Olympic Games
Annual total after the Olympic Games
B. Expenditure of the public administrations [in million of pesetas)
Synthesis
Accumulated total before and during the Olympic Games
Annual total after the Olympic Games
A-B tax balance = income minus the expenditures of all public administrations
Estimate of accumulated values in the
1986-1993 period











Tax deficit of 23,500 million [+/-15
thousand million)
Source: Brunet [1995, pp. 14-15)
Urban transformations
Evidence of the city's urban transformation ranges from the most physical
aspects, such as construction projects, to the most intangible, such as local self
esteem and international impact [which is actually one of the most valued effects of
the Games for Barcelonans) [Brunet 1995). This section provides details about the
transformations and how they affected the city and its economy. It is important to
keep in mind that most of these projects were completed because there were built-
in deadlines for them with huge penalties for failure to meet them [Marshall 1995, p.
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151). The main projects in the city of Barcelona were "the construction of the ring
roads of Barcelona (key roads to move around the circumference of Barcelona), the
opening of Barcelona to sea with the construction of the Olympic Village, the
creation of various new [centers] and the Olympic zones of Montjuic, Diagonal, and
Vail d'Hebron" (Brunet 1995, p. 7). These new ring roads provided long-term
benefits for many citizens. The two main locations of Montjuic and Val d'Hebron
provided the sporting facilities. Fifteen new venues were constructed and ten
existing venues were renovated. Barcelona also utilized another 43 existing facilities
that required little to no modification. These sports facilities benefit physically
active Barcelonans in the long run. Parc de Mar, the site of the Oljmipic Village, was
the most innovative of all in preparation for the Games. The city relied on the
Olympics to justify the conversion of an industrial site into a marina, rail network,
roads, and the Olympic Village. It was here that new beaches were developed along
with other waterfront facilities, such as shops and restaurants, which have
dramatically transformed the city (Essex 1998, p. 199). This benefits the wealthy
who were able to purchase the new housing, but also most of the citizens as a whole
due to more commercial activity and more tourism.
The Olympics also altered the growth trajectory of the city. The Games
required the city to upgrade its technology and telecommunications systems that
were essential to host the world's media. This has allowed Barcelona to promote
itself also as an administrative center (Essex 1998, p. 199). Overall, the six major
types of projects undertaken, in order of importance, according to Brunet, (1997, p.
7) were:
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1. Road and transportation infrastructures.
2. Housing, offices, and commercial venues.




Barcelona's selection as a host city allowed it to implement an elaborate
urban plan that had been developed previously. The perception of the city by
Barcelonans and foreigners has changed dramatically due to the 0l3mipic Games.
Barcelonans found a new sense of differentiation and identity that was not
prevalent beforehand. The perception of Barcelona as "relatively uniform, where the
differences were residual and where there was no significant differentiation
between different districts and streets" changed to "promote actions that would
make urban spaces specialized" (Brunet 1994, p. 16).
Civil construction projects, infrastructure, buildings, and installations were
all a result of direct and indirect Olympic investments. The Games created
permanent employment along with large amounts of public and private capital. The
city saw transformations through "greater capitalization, growth of the service
sector, internationalization, attractiveness, centrality, productivity, and
competitiveness" (Brunet 1995, p. 21). Barcelona repositioned itself as a bridge
between Europe and the Western Mediterranean region. Its metropolitan area
contained a "central axis of European communications". The city became a prime
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location for company headquarters and even for their plants. Barcelona
"consolidat[ed] its new role as a service [center] specialized in activities with high
surplus value" (Brunet 1995, p. 21).
Many projects were not directly needed for the Games, but nevertheless were
generated by them. This was the intention of the organizers. They wanted to "leave
behind the greatest number of fiilly useful investments after the Games" (Brunet
1995, p. 6). These investments seemed to have paid off because the city found itself
thriving by channeling the momentum of the Games towards the infrastructure and
investment that would pay future dividends. These effects reached beyond 1992 and
1993. (See Table 10 for a comparison between Olympic cities before they hosted the
Games.) This next section provides details about the long-run effects of this mega
event on Barcelona.
Long Run Effects - The Impact from 1992 to 2004
"The deepest impacts of the Olympic investments are in the long-term"
(Brunet 2005, p. 7). The planning for the Games relied mainly on the central
government's continuous support of the local administration with dependable, long
term promises of funding. The Generalitat (autonomous government of Catalonia)
was included in the project mainly to maintain a fully representative alliance. The
Generalitat funded and organized a much smaller part of the work that was to be
done (Marshall 1995, p. 151). Although 1993 was worse economically than 1992,
more than one decade after the Barcelona Games, the economic growth trend
between 1986 and 1992 has continued. Nineteen ninety-three saw poorer economic
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performance not just for Barcelona, but also for the entire region and all of Western
Europe. Every year since 1993, though, Barcelona has set new growth records on all
indicators, including employment, investment, income, and attractiveness. On a
scale never seen before, Barcelona maintained the growth that the Games helped it
generate in the first place (Brunet 2005, p. 8).
As seen previously, an additional 35,309 people, on average, were employed
due to Olympic-based activity in the preparatory phase (1986-1992) and 20,019
people had permanent jobs due to the Olympic investment. The average annual
employment effect from 1987 to 1993 of the Games was 59,328 people. Therefore,
at least 88.7% of the reduction in the number of registered unemployed in
Barcelona was due to the Games (Brunet 2005).
Immediately after the Games, 21,000 people became unemployed and this
number corresponds to the number employed by the COOB'92. Between 1993 and
1994, 18,000 more people were unemployed. However, over the following years,
unemployment fell again. After 1994, the investment from the Games seemed to
provide a buffer for the city's economy. It began to generate more jobs and was
resistant to the widespread recession (Brunet 2005, p. 9). The unemployment rate
began to drop in 1995. Recall that until 1993, the unemployment rate was cut in half
by creating 41,450 new jobs. The reduction of unemployment in 1995 stemmed in
part from the 20,230 permanent jobs that resulted from the investment in the
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An example of the economic progress that Barcelona has maintained is
represented well through the construction business. Between 1986 and 1992, the
consumption of cement increased by 2.5 times. Between 1986 and 2001, the figure
rose by 3.5 times. Additionally, although Barcelona's potential for new housing had
already been exploited and achieved, the building of houses expanded (Brunet
2005).
Between 1986 and 2000, 3.5 million visitors came to Barcelona each year.
doubling the number of international visitors from 1986. Hotel capacity between
those years also increased threefold. Barcelona's results are in sharp contrast to
those of Seoul (1988), Atlanta (1996), and Sydney (2000) (See Figures 3 and 4). The
response to "the Olympic stimulus has been more intense and sustained than that of
other host cities" (Brunet 2005, p. 9). Barcelona is therefore a model in terms of
performance and impact. It has reaped benefits from the Games for more than a
decade.
A key ingredient in Barcelona's success in the Games not only relies on
timing, but also on the investment in the quantity and quality of infrastructure. The
city found a way to maximize the Olympic impact, thereby attracting more
investment over time. Table 11 shows the continuation of investment. Barcelona's
success story started with the temporary employment increase in the construction
sector, followed by new, permanent employment in the operation of these
infrastructures. Not all of this increased economic performance was within the city.





















International Visitor Growth Pre, During and Post Olympic Games
(a) International visitors to the state of Georgia, therefore growth might be under
stated
(b) Forecast extrapolated from national estimates, therefore growth likely to be
understated
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Figure 5
Room Supply Increase Pre, During, and Post Olympic Games
Source: Jones Lang LaSalle IP Inc. (2002 p. 14)
(a),(b) See Figure 2
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Table 11
Investment in urban renewal in Barcelona, 1986-2010
Accumulated values










1992 - 2004 2004-2010
Investments related to Barcelona
2004 and Poblenou22@BCN (city
plans and projects)
Investments in metropolitan economic
Infrastructure




673 Environmental infrastructure 930 Environmental
infrastructure
1,800
2,036 Seafront1,375 Telecommunications 750
[telephones & cables)
AVE and non-regional trainsHousing, offices, and premises 1,6581,556 AVE 2,100
Extension of airport
Extension of port





2004 & Sant Andreu
800
Sports equipment & facilities 841 1,500976
Cultural, health facilities &
others
237 Electric network 589 720




Metro, urban trains, trams and
buses
1,394 2,675
TotalTotal 10,660 Total 9,875 17,640
+ Urban Renewal






General Total General Total 11,796 General Total 20,04012,263
2005, p. 16]Source: Brunet
increased the city's attractiveness, prosperity, welfare, and social solidarity [Brunet
2005).
Compared to other Olympic Games, Barcelona seems to be on outlier as an
example of a success story through its organization, investment, and the resulting
economic impact. Figure 6 represents this well. The investments and economic I
impact there do not compare to any of the other Olympic Games; only Tokyo had
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ff Induced economic impact5000




Economic resources used by the Olympic Games, 1964-2004: organization,
investment, and impact (millions of $ in 2000)
Source: Brunet (2005, p. 25)
The financial balance of the Games is an important factor to consider. It
shows the costs of the Olympic-related public administration and the income of the
Games both directly and indirectly. Table 12 shows that between 1986 and 1992,
expenses for public infrastructure were high. Also, though, the income for the public
administration was above-trend because of the taxable activities of the Olympics.
Furthermore, after 1992, the only public
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spending related to the Olympics was for the upkeep of the Olympic Legacy.
Conversely, the income from "private capital and economic activity generated by the
Games had risen sharply” (Brunet 2005, p. 8). The financial balance therefore is
positive.
Many of these long run effects are due in part to the city's fully conscious
strategic planning set in motion by the city council in 1988. It strived to look beyond
1992 and to take full advantage of the Olympics investments. By 1993, the plan was
revised in order to be more effective. This first plan's aim was to "consolidate
Barcelona as an enterprising European metropolis, affecting the macroregion in
which it is located, with a modern quality of life, socially balanced and strongly
rooted in Mediterranean culture” (Pla Estrategic, 1990). The goal then was to ensure
that the global public exposure would enhance the place-marketing of Barcelona
after the funding from Madrid for local political goals had declined greatly. The city
council implemented this project to be more of a normal operation within the city
council than as a one-time event. The plan created a partnership for city-guidance in
which the public and private sectors collaborated their investments for the overall
gain of the city. Although public investment was still seen as important for
infrastructure purposes, the search for international investment and consumption
spending through tourists, multinational firms, and international public agencies
was seen as just as important, if not more (Marshall 1995, p. 153-154).
By 1993, a new and more ambitious plan took the place of its 1988
predecessor. The revised aim was to "increase the integration of the Barcelona
region into the international economy, in order to guarantee its growth in terms of
economic progress and quality of life" (Pla Estrategic, 1994). The impetus for this
revision was that Barcelona had improved so much within such a short amount of
time that its potential had to be fiilly realized by undertaking further developments.
At the local level, better specialized structuring was required through transport
investment. At the regional level, more complementary gains would be realized
through cooperation of tourism planning, infrastructure coordination, and regional
city links. At the continental level, Barcelona would function as a main European hut
for air and ground connections, convention centers, and hotels, allowing it to be
attractive to international investors and institutions. At the transcontinental level.
educational, technological, and migration policies would enhance the city as a link to
North Africa, America, and the Far East. All of this is due to the newly perceived
importance and imminence of globalization and the potential of Barcelona to take
advantage of the phenomenon. The main reason that this plan functioned well is not
due to the methodology of the plan, but instead to the political dynamic in which




After reviewing numerous studies on mega-events, it can be concluded that while
most do not generate large economic impacts, most host-cities do receive some
economic benefits despite the fact that they are commonly overestimated before the
fact. Many cities do not harness events to their fullest potential due to over¬
investment, crowding out, and substitution effects. Many host cities also have
inefficiencies in planning, budgeting, and security.
Barcelona is a leading example of a host city that reaped the benefits for as
long as it could. Generally, the success is due to the occurrence of the Games at the
right time and right place to the right people. The COOB'92, along with the other
governments, planned for this event extensively and used it as a means for urban
change and renewal. The city went from a depression to an economic boom as a
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result of attracting investment, lowering unemployment, maintaining low local
investment, low organizational costs, and investing through regional
decentralization. It was also due to the impressive amount of money collected from
licenses and sponsorships as well as the construction of office space, which led to
the city's future as a business center. Furthermore, the economic benefits from the
Games were reflected in the revival of the housing market, although this harmed the
lower-income earners. Unlike other host cities, Barcelona did not overly-invest in
accommodations for visitors. Instead, it constructed only a reasonable amount of
additional hotel space and waited until after the Games to build more according to
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its tourism growth pattern. Furthermore, the city utilized as many existing
structures as it could to host the Games. Barcelona's gains flowed from its success in
organizational and sporting terms, the far-reaching economic and social impacts
from the urban transformation, and productively controlling the momentum of the
Games.
The Games proved to be a protective cushion and shock absorber for the city
while the rest of Europe went through an economic crisis. This timing was due in
large part to luck and is one of the main reasons why the success was so prevalent
and far-reaching. Purchasing power did indeed decrease for the citizens of
Barcelona due to the high rate of inflation, but the benefits seemed to outweigh the
costs. The city reinvented itself by diversifying its neighborhoods and beautifying
the city, in part through adding numerous green spaces. The port was opened up
and several beaches were developed. The city was designed to become a tourist
center and that it did. The development of the city's telecommunications
capabilities, along with its roads and airport allowed it to become a transportation
center for Europe as well. The majority of the people were enthusiastic about the
changes and improvements of the city, which only propelled them too to join in on
the potential benefits.
Lastly, long-term planning before and after the Games helped the city to
capture the economic benefits from hosting the Olympics. Substantial planning was
undertaken to secure ongoing funding from the central Spanish government. The
growth trend for the city has been substantially positive ever since the Games. The
city invested in infrastructure constructing office space, expanding technology, and
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the developing easy and cheap access to and within the city. The income of the
public administration was very high because many of the Olympic activities were
taxable. Furthermore, the revisions and adjustments to long-term city plans for the
city took advantage of globalization by making Barcelona a main connection for
Europe by air and ground. It also made the city a link to Africa, America, and Far
East through policies of education, technology, and migration. Barcelona
successfully reaped the benefits from the Games and the effects are still evident
today. The city had the benefit of having a great organization mixed along with a bit
of luck. Timing is everything in the case for Barcelona’s success. The city
undoubtedly would not be what it is today without its hosting of the Olympics in
1992. The only other somewhat very successful Olympic Games was the 1984 LA
Olympics, in which the similarities with Barcelona are strikingly similar. Both cities
utilized as many existing structures as possible, generated large amounts of income
from broadcast rights, and partnered the private and publics sectors successfully
within the organizing committees. One of the main differences between the two
events is that the LA Games did not focus on infrastructure while that was a
principle concern for Barcelona. Regardless, whether or not other host-cities can
use Barcelona as a successful example is difficult because no circumstances are ever
exactly the same and 1992 provided near-perfect timing for the city's hosting of the




In order to fully understand the ability of investments to generate primary,
secondary, and induced impacts, the theory of multipliers must be understood. A
multiplier (numerical value) estimates how many times a unit of currency (i.e., one
dollar, one euro) once spent within an economy will be re-spent within that same
economy. There are three different stages of the overall effect of the new money.
Firstly, the direct effect is the first effect that the new money has on the economy. As
Figure 6 represents, the host economy receives new money through industries such
as accommodation, food, transportation, and Game tickets. Secondly, the indirect
effect is the impact of that new money within the economy (the manner in which the
new money is re-spent within the economy). Leakages do occur and must be taken
into account. One example of leakages is new money that is spent on imports from
another country; another is when it is just put into savings. Thirdly and lastly, the
induced effect is the proportion of household income re-spent in other businesses in
the economy. Once the new money is put into the economy, it enters into the
incomes of the local population (Kasimati 2003, p. 434). That local population then
spends that additional income on other items that they demand.
Robert J. Barro (2009) explains the offsetting effects of anticipated multiplier
effects very well. He analyzes the multiplier effect of the massive increase of the
defense budget during World War II, which many think rescued the nation from the
Great Depression. He estimates that. World War II raised U.S. defense expenditures
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by $540 billion (1996 dollars] per year at the peak in 1943-44, amounting to 44% of
real GDP. The war raised real GDP by $430 billion per year in 1943-44. Thus, the
multiplier was 0.8 (430/540]. The other way to put this is that the war lowered
components of GDP aside from military purchases. The main declines were in
private investment, nonmilitary parts of government purchases, and net exports —
personal consumer expenditure changed little. Wartime production siphoned off
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Figure 6
Model and Example of Multiplier Effects
Source: Kasimati (2003, p. 435)
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